The Beijing consensus is to keep quietMay 6th 2010 | BEIJING
From The Economist print edition
In the West people worry that developing countries want to copy “the China model”. Such talk makes people in China uncomfortable（西方人擔憂發展中國家想要從中國拷貝「中國模式」過來，但中國人對這樣的說法感到不安）
CHINESE officials said the opening of the World Expo in Shanghai on April 30th would be simple and frugal. It wasn’t. The display of fireworks, laser beams, fountains and dancers rivalled the extravagance of Beijing’s Olympic ceremonies in 2008. The government’s urge to show off Chinese dynamism proved irresistible. For many, the razzmatazz lit up the China model for all the world to admire. （上海世博的場面可以被世人當作「中國模式」之成功的證據）
The multi-billion-dollar expo embodies this supposed model, which has won China many admirers in developing countries and beyond. A survey by the Pew Research Centre, an American polling organisation, found that 85% of Nigerians viewed China favourably last year (compared with 79% in 2008), as did 50% of Americans (up from 39% in 2008) and 26% of Japanese (up from 14%, see chart). China’s ability to organise the largest ever World Expo, including a massive upgrade to Shanghai’s infrastructure, with an apparent minimum of the bickering that plagues democracies, is part of what dazzles. （無論是針對開發中與已開發國家，中國都贏得了許多仰慕者。美國的一民調單位作的調查顯示，從2008到2009年之間，許多國家的人民對中國的好感都增加了。PS. favorable view的確切中文意義，我不太確定。）
Scholars and officials in China itself, however, are divided over whether there is a China model (or “Beijing consensus” as it was dubbed in 2004 by Joshua Cooper Ramo, an American consultant, playing on the idea of a declining “Washington consensus”), and if so what the model is and whether it is wise to talk about it. The Communist Party is diffident about laying claim to any development model that other countries might copy. Official websites widely noted a report by a pro-Party newspaper in Hong Kong, Ta Kung Pao, calling the expo “a display platform for the China model”. But Chinese leaders avoid using the term and in public describe the expo in less China-centred language. （但中國內部的學者與關於則對「中國模式」等相關問題沒有取得共識。中國的領導人自己則避免使用「中國模式」一詞。）
Not so China’s publishing industry, which in recent months has been cashing in on an upsurge of debate in China about the notion of a China model (one-party rule, an eclectic approach to free markets and a big role for state enterprise being among its commonly identified ingredients). In November a prominent Party-run publisher produced a 630-page tome titled “China Model: A New Development Model from the Sixty Years of the People’s Republic”. In January came the more modest “China Model: Experiences and Difficulties”. Another China-model book was launched in April and debated at an expo-related forum in Shanghai. Its enthusiastic authors include Zhao Qizheng, a former top Party propaganda official, and John Naisbitt, an American futurologist. （中國的出版業者卻是紛紛推出大談「中國模式」的著作）
Western publishers have been no less enthused by China’s continued rapid growth. The most recent entry in the field is “The Beijing Consensus, How China’s Authoritarian Model Will Dominate the Twenty-First Century” by Stefan Halper, an American academic. Mr Halper, who has served as an official in various Republican administrations, argues that “just as globalisation is shrinking the world, China is shrinking the West” by quietly limiting the projection of its values. （西方出版業者也不落人後，最近的一本是美國學者Stefan Halper寫的『北京共識：中國的威權體制將如何在二十一世紀主宰世界？』該書主張「全球化使地球縮小，而中國使西方縮小，因為西方價值的受歡迎度降低了。」）
But despite China’s status as “the world’s largest billboard advertisement for the new alternative” of going capitalist and staying autocratic, Party leaders are, as Mr Halper describes it, gripped by a fear of losing control and of China descending into chaos. It is this fear, he says, that is a driving force behind China’s worrying external behaviour. Party rule, the argument runs, depends on economic growth, which in turn depends on resources supplied by unsavoury countries. Politicians in Africa in fact rarely talk about following a “Beijing consensus”. But they love the flow of aid from China that comes without Western lectures about governance and human rights. （然而，作者指出，共產黨領導人自己知道，中國的政治很不穩定。經濟成長是維持穩定的要素，而成長的動力來自於一些落後國家的資源。非洲國家的政治人物很少討論所謂的『北京共識』，但他們都很愛中國在提供給他們的幫助的同時，不會像西方國家一樣對他們說教。）
The same fear makes Chinese leaders reluctant to wax lyrical about a China model. They are acutely aware of American sensitivity to any talk suggesting the emergence of a rival power and ideology—and conflict with America could wreck China’s economic growth. （也因為內部政治的不穩定，中國不願意公然得罪美國。）
In 2003 Chinese officials began talking of the country’s “peaceful rise”, only to drop the term a few months later amid worries that even the word “rise” would upset the flighty Americans. Zhao Qizheng, the former propaganda official, writes that he prefers “China case” to “China model”. Li Junru, a senior Party theorist, said in December that talk of a China model was “very dangerous” because complacency might set in that would sap enthusiasm for further reforms. （2003年中國官員開始談起「和平崛起」，但幾個月後就不再提這個概念。有人傾向用「中國案例」來取代「中國模式」。有人認為，「中國模式」之說非常危險，因為它帶來的自滿會打消中國人追求改革的熱情。）
Some Chinese lament that this is already happening. Political reform, which the late architect of China’s developmental model, Deng Xiaoping, once argued was essential for economic liberalisation, has barely progressed since he crushed the Tiananmen Square protests in 1989. Liu Yawei of the Carter Centre, an American human-rights group wrote last month that efforts by Chinese scholars to promote the idea of a China model have become “so intense and effective” that political reform has been “swept aside”. （有些中國人惋惜中國人對政治改革的熱情已經在消退了。從天安門事件之後，中國就幾乎沒有政治自由化。「中國模式」之說是如此有力，幾乎再也無人關心政治改革。）
Chinese leaders’ fear of chaos suggests they themselves are not convinced that they have found the right path. Talk of a model is made all the harder by the stability-threatening problems that breakneck growth engenders, from environmental destruction to rampant corruption and a growing gap between rich and poor. One of China’s more outspoken media organisations, Caixin, this week published an article by Joseph Nye, an American academic. In it Mr Nye writes of the risks posed by China’s uncertain political trajectory. “Generations change, power often creates hubris and appetites sometimes grow with eating,” he says. （中國領導人對動亂的恐懼，就說明他們自己也知道他們還沒有找到所謂的「中國模式」。）
One Western diplomat, using the term made famous by Mr Nye, describes the expo as a “competition between soft powers”. But if China’s soft power is in the ascendant and America’s declining—as many Chinese commentators write—the event, which is due to end on October 31st, hardly shows it. True, China succeeded in persuading a record number of countries to take part. But visitor turnout has been far lower than organisers had anticipated. And queues outside America’s dour pavilion have been among the longest.（上海的世博會也證實的「中國模式」並不存在。儘管參展的國家破紀錄了，但觀眾的數量卻遠不如預期。諷刺的是，等著參觀美國館的隊總是最長的其中一列。）
http://www.economist.com/world/asia/PrinterFriendly.cfm?story_id=16059990
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